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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I sauntered up to the election booth in the Parma Heights, Ohio municipal garage 
prepared to make some election history.  With the 2000 election behind me, I knew 
that each vote I cast could prove to be the deciding vote.1  As I slid the ballot card 
into the appropriate slot and lifted the stylus with which I would soon raise ordinary 
people to new political highs, I was confident.  Governor, U.S. Representative, State 
Senator, and State Representative, my decisions were sure and swift.  I turned the 
sheet and was confronted with the Supreme Court races, two this year.  I recall 
seeing some rather acrimonious advertisements but was unable to recall what the 
judges actually stood for.  Was this the Republican-business lover, or the Democrat 
who favors the trial bar?  I was unsure how to best evaluate which was the better 
candidate for the Ohio Supreme Court.  “Perhaps I’ll have better luck with the 
appellate judicial contests,” I thought to myself and calmly flipped the page leaving 
my votes un-cast.  Long moments passed as I stared confusedly at the many names 
lining my ballot, secretly hoping I would be able to blame my indecision on my 
inability to read a butterfly ballot.  After realizing that I was unable to make an 
intelligent and informed choice on any of the judicial races, I poked my head out of 
the booth to see if anyone else was having the type of trouble I was.  Concluding my 
business in the booth, I humbly walked over to the drop box, praying the attendant 
would not notice that the majority of my ballot was not punched, not even a hanging 
chad.  Confused and unhappy, I consoled myself with a grande double non-fat latte.  
Wouldn’t you? 
Our legal system rests on the fundamental idea that judges will serve as 
independent and un-biased arbiters of the law.2  Unfortunately, the current model for 
seating judges in Ohio through non-partisan elections3 falls far short of the mark, as a 
poll of Ohio citizens found that ninety percent of Ohio citizens believed political 
contributions affected judicial decisions.4  Ohio is not alone in its approach, as fully 
forty percent of the states utilize elections as the primary method for the selection of 
appellate level judges.5  Indeed, the number of elected judges now exceeds the 
                                                                
1It would be difficult not to recall the tragedy of the “chad” during the 2000 Presidential 
election.  While America waited and watched, officials counted individual ballots in order to 
determine the voter’s intent.  In the end Vice President Gore lost the election. 
2Justice for Hire: A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee 
of the Committee for Economic Development, at 1 (2002), at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/ 
report_judicial.pdf [hereinafter Justice for Hire].  (Last visited Jan. 18, 2004). 
3Ohio elections do not list party affiliations and are therefore non-partisan; however 
candidates must run in partisan primary elections and do so often with party endorsements. 
4A.B.A. Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Lawyers' Political 
Contributions, Part Two, at 123 (1998), at http://www.brennancenter.org.  (Last visited Feb. 2, 
2003). 
5Justice for Hire, supra note 2, app. at 43.  See also information from the American 
Judicature Society, at http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_state-select-map.asp (last visited Jan. 
18, 2004) (stating that there are currently thirty-nine states in the US that in some way elect 
their appellate level judges. Of these, twenty-three states have contested partisan or 
nonpartisan judicial elections for appellate judges).  
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number of elected state legislators and executive officers in this country.6  While 
there is no absolute uniformity among the states as to the selection of judges, every 
state seats judges in one of a few ways.  Those states that do not employ elections, as 
their primary means of selecting judges, utilize some manner of merit selection.7  
Most merit selection plans utilize some form of a nominating committee to evaluate 
candidates.  Those names of the individuals the nominating committee feels are 
qualified are then forwarded to the individual, usually the governor, who will then 
appoint from the pool of individuals selected by the commission.8  No state currently 
employs a pure appointive system modeled after the federal system.9   
This note will examine the problems that the election of state judges creates, as 
well as the inadequacies of the current model of merit selection.  I propose that Ohio 
should adopt an appointive method of selecting judges, which will utilize a judicial 
eligibility commission as outlined by the American Bar Association10 similar to the 
nominating commissions commonly found in merit selection plans but which will do 
away with the commonly found retention election.  As Chief Judge Moyer of the 
Ohio Supreme Court said in reference to the November 2002 judicial election in 
Ohio we “have been subjected to the dark side of democracy.”11  Ohio needs to 
change the manner in which state judges are selected in order to bring confidence in 
the state judiciary, and to ensure that the most qualified individuals sit on the bench 
in Ohio.   
II.  PITFALLS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
Judicial elections are fundamentally contrary to the goal of an independent and 
impartial judiciary.12  Former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge recently said, 
                                                                
6Id. at 1.   
There are more than 30,000 judges in the fifty states, including more than 1,300 state 
appellate judges, 11,000 state trial judges, and almost 18,000 limited-jurisdiction 
judges.  Over eight-seven percent of these judges must face the voters at regular 
intervals in some type of popular election.  Thirty-nine states currently require 
elections for those seeking or holding judicial office at some level. 
Id. 
7Id. app. at 43-44. 
8Mark Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection 
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 301 (2002). 
9See infra Part III.B. 
10See infra Part VII. 
11Jack Torry, Ohioans Endured the Most TV Ads, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Nov. 21, 
2002, at 1D. 
12Justice for Hire, supra note 2, at 25. 
Most of the litigation in this country—perhaps as large a share as 98 percent of the 
cases—is conducted in state courts.  America is the only country that elects such a 
large proportion of its judges by popular vote.  Such a system is inconsistent with our 
objective of credible, impartial, and effective dispensation of justice.  The suggestion 
is that America has fallen behind in realizing that electing judges is not the most 
effective way to ensure an independent judiciary.   
Id. 
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“[t]he restraint, temperament and detachment that we rightly demand from our 
judges is fundamentally incongruous with partisan statewide political campaigns.  In 
my opinion, campaigning is precisely the wrong thing to ask our judges to do!”13  ck 
D’Aurora noted that it makes little sense to ask our judicial candidates to announce 
their positions on current topics.  Judges, unlike legislators and most state executives, 
are charged, not with carrying out the will of the people, but with the neutral 
dispassionate arbitration of the law.14  Our system of electing judges has several 
negative effects: 1) election of judges gives the appearance that the judiciary will be 
unable to act with the independence and impartiality necessary for the proper; 2) 
election of judges undermines the public confidence in the judiciary; and 3) election 
of judges may discourage qualified candidates from seeking the bench.   
A.  Our System of Electing State Judges Threatens Judicial Independence 
Forcing judicial candidates to run in contested elections threatens judicial 
independence, as candidates are forced to raise large sums of money in order to 
compete against their opponent.15  Prior to the onset of heavy media use by judicial 
candidates, campaigns were run without a great deal of money spent and little 
fanfare;16 the climate has shifted dramatically.17 For example, in Alabama, total 
spending on two Supreme Court seats increased over $1.8 million over a ten-year 
period.18  In Montana, average spending on a race for Supreme Court more than 
                                                                
13Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 277-278, (quoting Governor Tom Ridge).  
14Jack D’Aurora, Elections Are Poor Way To Choose Judges, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Ohio), Nov. 6, 2001, at 11A.  “Electing judges makes little sense.  Judges do not engage in 
the type of activity that requires them to espouse positions on current topics.  Unlike 
legislators and most other elected officials, they are not charged with carrying out the will of 
the people.”  Id. 
15The following table details the money spent by the candidates in the 2002 Ohio Supreme 
Court election from January 1 until November 2, 2002, at http://www.brennancenter.org.  
(Last visited Feb. 10, 2003). 
 Number of Ads Number of Airings Cost of Airtime 
Black 2 1546 $676,737 
Burnside 4 1387 $619,225 
O’Connor 4 2425 $912,601 
Stratton 7 2794 $1,172,844 
      O’Connor/ 
Stratton 
4 802 $389,895 
 
Total 21 8954 $3,771,302 
 
 
16Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 193 (1996). 
17Id. 
18The ten-year period was from 1986 to 1996.  ABA COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, 
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS:  REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (2002), at http://www.abanet.org/judind/pdf/commissionreport4-03.pdf 
(Last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter REPORT].   
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doubled from 1984 to 1986.19  Here in Ohio, the campaign for the Chief Justice seat 
increased over $2.5 million from $100 thousand in 1980, to $2.7 million in 1986.20    
Candidates must solicit campaign contributions from the very individuals who 
may be appearing before them in the courtroom as well as from those parties or 
persons who may have an interest in the outcome of cases that will come before the 
judge.21  For example, more than forty percent of the money contributed to the 
winning candidates for the Texas Supreme Court between 1994 and 1997 was 
contributed by parties or attorneys with cases before the court or from individuals 
and organizations linked to parties with cases before the court.22  Elected judges may 
feel it is necessary to reward campaign contributors by providing their supporters 
with favorable rulings, which may be contrary to the rule of law; likewise, the judge 
may feel compelled to rule against those individuals and businesses which did not 
support the judge.23  Similarly, a judicial candidate may feel it is necessary to “adopt 
the political or social agenda that arrives tied to a stack of cash,”24 and become 
beholden to special interest.25  Indeed, T.C. Brown noted in a February, 2000, 
                                                                
19Id. at 12.  Average spending increased from $63,647 to $138,460.  Id. 
20Id.  
21Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, 84 A.B.A. J. 68, 69-71 (1998).  In the 1996 Ohio 
Supreme Court race, more than 50% of contributed funds came from lawyers.  Id. at 71.  See 
also Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 279; REPORT, supra note 18, at 13. 
As the cost of campaigning escalates, judicial candidates are required to raise more 
and more money from contributors who typically include lawyers, prospective 
litigants or organizations with an economic or political interest in the outcomes of 
cases to be decided by the courts to which the candidates are seeking election (or 
reelection) [sic]. It bears emphasis that unlike executive and legislative branch races, 
which are supported by a comparatively diverse funding base, judicial races attract the 
attention of a narrower band of interested contributors that have traditionally been 
limited to lawyers, and more recently been expanded to include a range of interested 
groups. 
Id. at 13. 
22Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 279. 
23Id. at 278. 
24Id. 
25The following table provided by the Brennan Center shows the amount of money spent 
by special interest groups in the 2002 Ohio Supreme Court election from January 1 until 
November 5, 2002, at http://www.brennancenter.org (Last visited Feb. 10, 2003). 
 Number of Ads Number of 
Airings 
Cost of Airtime 
Citizens for Independent Court 4 2222 $760,706 
Competition Ohio 1 140 $115,690 
Consumers for a Fair Court 1 550 $220,416 
Informed Citizens of Ohio 2 1235 $738,181 
 
Total 8 4147 $1,834,993 
 
Id. 
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Cleveland Plain Dealer article, that the Ohio Supreme Court ruled favorably two-
thirds of the time in cases involving the twenty Cleveland-area attorneys who had 
contributed the most to the justices’ political campaigns.26 
Advocates of lawyer contributions to judicial campaigns suggest that the 
“informed opinions of attorneys should be brought to the public’s attention, and that 
the bar should actively show support for or against judicial candidates.”27  
Proponents also argue that contributions from lawyers may be small and therefore 
pose no threat to judicial independence.28  A final, if weak, argument is that without 
lawyer contributions, a judicial candidate may not be able to adequately fund a 
campaign.29  However, attorney contributions have not had the effect that the above 
arguments suggest30 as David Barnhizer relates several instances in which lawyers 
have felt the effects of judicial fund-raising.31 
                                                          
See also generally Kara Baker, Comment, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio?  An Examination of 
Ohio Judicial Elections and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio 
Supreme Court, 35 AKRON L. REV. 159 (2001); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 279-80.  
There is at least some empirical evidence that the threat to judicial impartiality caused 
by campaign contributions is more than mere perception—lawyer contributions may 
in fact influence court decisions.  A 2001 Texans for Public Justice study compared 
contributions by attorneys and law firms to Texas Supreme Court campaigns and the 
Texas Supreme Court’s rate of accepting petitions for appeal between 1994 and 1998. 
. . . While the average overall petition—acceptance rate was 11%, this rate leapt to an 
astonishing 56% for petitioners who contributed more than $250,000 to the justices.  
In contrast, non-contributing petitioners enjoyed an acceptance rate of just 5.5%.   
Id. 
26T. C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A.  (The justices denied any connection between the donations 
and the rulings.) 
27Bradley Siciliano, Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns: Creating the 
Appearance of Impropriety, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 222 (1991).   
28Id. at 222. 
29Id.  Prior to the onslaught of media advertising in judicial campaigns, judicial candidates 
were able to fund their campaigns without the huge influx of money from donors, whether 
attorney or otherwise.  See also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
30See generally David Barnhizer, “On the Make:” Campaign Funding and the Corrupting 
of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 (2001). 
31Id. at 378-80. 
I asked a lawyer whether he had ever contributed to judicial campaigns.  His answer 
was revealing and troubling.  He told me he had done so only once and the experience 
showed him just how dangerous it was.  This lawyer, who practices in Southern 
California, said that a local prosecutor’s office decided to run several of their assistant 
district attorneys against judges whose rulings they did not like.  Some of the lawyers 
in the area decided to create a committee to raise funds for the endangered judges and 
he contributed funds and his name to the committee.  He related how in the midst of 
the heated election campaign, he was beginning a trial before a judge whose judicial 
friends and colleagues the lawyers’ committee was supporting.  At the beginning of 
the trial, the judge’s bailiff entered the courtroom with a paper in his hand and then 
passed it to the judge.  The judge looked down at the paper, looked up at the opposing 
lawyer (who was not on the lawyers’ committee) without saying a word or changing 
expression and then looked back down at the paper.  A few seconds later he looked up 
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Unfortunately, attorney contributions to judicial campaigns do not have the 
effects that the proponents of attorney contributions desire.  Rather, the contributions 
create the potential for ethical dilemmas for both the attorneys and the judges.  Bill 
Weisenberg, Ohio Bar Association Director of Governmental Affairs during the 
1987 campaign to put merit selection on the Ohio ballot32 stated, “people don’t 
contribute large sums of money and expect the other guy to be treated fairly.”33  The 
act of providing funds to judicial candidates is inconsistent with the idea and goal of 
an independent judiciary in Ohio.   
B.  Judicial Elections Undermine Public Confidence 
The Justice at Stake Campaign34 recently conducted a poll showing that: seventy-
six percent of voters and twenty-six percent of state judges believe that campaign 
                                                          
at my lawyer friend and smiled at him.  From that point and throughout the trial the 
contributing lawyer “could do no wrong” and received an unbroken string of favorable 
rulings. 
Id. at 378-79.  Barnhizer provides a further example:  
During a recent campaign for a seat on a local Ohio Domestic Relations Court, a 
lawyer from a small firm ran up against a political, ethical, and financial dilemma.  
His predicament began innocently enough when he was solicited for a campaign 
contribution by supporters of the Democratic incumbent.  The lawyer, a longtime 
Democrat, willingly put his signature on a $250 check to the judge’s campaign.  Soon, 
however, he was contacted by the campaign of the judge’s Republican opponent.  
Would the lawyer be willing to contribute to their candidate’s campaign as well?  The 
lawyer, who almost never gave to Republican candidates, nonetheless wrote out a 
matching check.  His rationale was simple: His legal practice involved frequent 
appearances in family court, and he simply could not afford to risk offending 
whichever judge was eventually elected. 
Id. at 379. 
32See infra Section IV. 
33John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike One, Strike Two . . . :  The History of and 
Prospect for Judicial Reform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193, 196 (1992). 
34A nationwide, nonpartisan group whose mission is to “educate the public and work for 
reforms to keep politics and special interests out of the courtroom—so judges can do their job 
protecting the Constitution, individual rights and the rule of law.” The Justice at Stake 
Campaign lists the following partners:  Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice; 
American Bar Association; American Judicature Society; Appleseed Foundation; Brennan 
Center for Justice at NYU School of Law; Campaigns for People; Chicago Appleseed Fund 
for Justice; Citizen Action/Illinois; Citizens for an Independent Judiciary; Committee for 
Economic Development; The Committee for Modern Courts; Common Cause; The 
Constitution Project; Democracy South/Georgia Project; The Greenlining Institute; The 
Illinois Campaign for Political Reform; Kansas Appleseed Center for Law and Justice; 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; League of Women Voters Judicial 
Independence Project; Michigan Campaign Finance Network; Michigan League of Women 
Voters; National Center for State Courts; National Institute on Money in State Politics; North 
Carolina Center for Voter Education; Ohio Citizen Action; Ohio League of Women Voters; 
Oklahoma Appleseed Center for Law and Justice; Pennsylvanians for  Modern Courts; 
Protestants for the Common Good; Public Campaign; The Reform Institute; Tallahassee 
League of Women Voters; Texans for Public Justice; Wisconsin Citizen Action; and 
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, at http://www.justiceatstake.org.  (Last visited Feb. 10, 
2003). 
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contributions made to judges have at least some influence on their decisions; sixty-
two percent of voters—including ninety percent of African-American voters—feel 
that America has two systems of justice, one for the wealthy and one for everyone 
else; and nine in ten voters, and eight in ten state judges say that they are quite 
concerned about special interest buying advertisements in order to influence the 
outcome of judicial elections.35  The American Bar Association Standing Committee 
on Judicial Independence noted that “the old adage that ‘money talks’ is accepted 
wisdom when it comes to assessing whether judges are likely to be influenced by the 
campaign contributions they receive.”36  For example, in Louisiana, a survey 
revealed that over half of voters thought that judicial decisions were influenced by 
the contributions a judicial candidate received.37  Judge Dennis Duggan, a family 
court judge in New York, stated that the perception that judges can be influenced by 
contributions to their election “pervades not only the general public but the 
profession as well.”38  Electing state judges poses a serious threat to the public 
confidence in the judiciary.39   
The lack of public confidence in the judiciary is exacerbated by the increased use 
of “attack” ads during judicial campaigns.40  An article in the Cincinnati Post quoted 
Mark Kozlowski, a staff attorney at the Brennan Center for Justice,41 as saying: “The 
greater extent to which these races become TV ads and attack ads and all the things 
we associate with a race for Congress, the more cynical the people will become in 
respect to what judges do.”42  During the 2002 election campaign for the Ohio 
                                                                
35Justice at Stake Poll, at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/pollingsummaryFINAL.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2004)..  
36REPORT, supra note 18, at 20. 
37Id. at 21. 
38Id. at 22 (quoting Judge Dennis Duggan). 
39Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 283.   
A 1998 study sponsored by the Texas Supreme Court found that 83% of Texas adults, 
69% of court personnel, and 79% of Texas attorneys believed that campaign 
contributions influenced judicial decisions ‘very significantly’ or ‘fairly significantly.’  
Even 48% of Texas judges confessed that they believed money had an impact on 
judicial decisions.  That same year, a poll sponsored by a special commission 
appointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that nine out of ten voters 
believed that judicial decisions were influenced by large campaign contributions. 
Id. 
40Id. 
41The Brennan Center for Justice is located at New York University School of Law.  The 
Center’s mission is to “develop and implement an innovative, nonpartisan agenda of 
scholarship, public education, and legal action that promotes equality and human dignity, 
while safeguarding fundamental freedoms.”  The Brennan Center receives support from 
foundations, law firms, and individuals.  See  http://www.brennancenter.org (Last visited Jan. 
18, 2004). 
42Mark Kozlowski noted that public opinion already holds a cynical attitude towards the 
judiciary by stating, “Increasingly, people think that it is a quaint concept . . . that judges really 
do try to decide cases according to the law.”  Randy Ludlow, High-Stakes Race Draws 
National Scrutiny, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 9, 2000, at 1B. 
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Supreme Court, attack ads were plentiful.  For example, one advertisement depicted 
a down on his luck working man who states:  “Eve Stratton calls herself ‘the velvet 
hammer.’  Yeah, corporations get the velvet.  Ohio families get the hammer.”43  
Early in 2001, a group of Ohio judges, attorneys, and legal scholars met at the 
University of Toledo College of Law to discuss judicial elections.  At the meeting, 
Chief Justice Thomas Moyer, in a call for judicial appointments, stated: “The 
primary fault I see with [electing judges] is the tremendous amount of money that 
flows into campaigns, large amounts of it from interests involved before the Supreme 
Court.  Even if we assume it has no influence on the system, the perception of it 
couldn’t be worse.”44  It is likely that the public confidence in an independent 
judiciary will continue to be low as the public continues to see judicial candidates 
engaged in invidious character assassinations.   
C.  Judicial Elections May Discourage Qualified Individuals 
Alexander Hamilton, co-author of The Federalist Papers,45 related in Federalist 
No. 78: 
there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in 
the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And making the proper 
deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must 
be still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite 
knowledge.46   
Hamilton envisioned a judiciary that was appointed rather than elected.47  Ohio’s 
system of electing judges, rather than appointing them, is likely shying qualified 
judges away from the bench.48  Many potential jurists will choose not to seek 
election to the bench due to being uncomfortable with raising funds.  As Justice 
                                                                
43Catherine Candisky, Supreme Court Candidates Upset by Groups’ New TV Ads, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Oct. 23, 2002, at 4E.  Another ad shows a pregnant woman 
arriving for an appointment at her obstetrician’s office only to find that the obstetrician has 
closed up shop due to high malpractice awards.  The implication being that unless the voters 
elected a jurist who would effectively shut down the trial lawyers, doctors would be run out of 
business and the general public would be left without the ability to receive quality medical 
care.   
44Joe Hallett, Should Ohio Stop Electing Judges?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Apr. 8, 
2001, at 1G.  
45Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison drafted the Federalist Papers.  
Hamilton, Jay, and Madison sought to influence those who were debating ratification of the 
Constitution, and specifically those who were to attend the New York state ratification 
convention.  They wrote and published under the pseudonym “Publius,” and the general public 
did not know their true identity for decades.  THE FEDERALIST PAPERS READER, XIV 
(Frederick Quinn ed., 1993). 
46Id. at 168. 
47Judicial Appointments White Paper Task Force, The Case for Judicial Appointments, 33 
U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 357 (2002). 
48Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 286.  “The mere requirement of participating in a 
contested judicial election and the necessity of raising large amounts of cash may cause 
qualified candidates to opt out of public service.”   
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
132 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:xxx 
Joseph Grodin opined, “a judge asking lawyers for money is quite degrading and 
threatens their integrity.”49  Those candidates who are unable or unwilling to raise 
significant funds may be unable to compete effectively for judicial office against 
those candidates who are either independently wealthy or who have connections to 
wealthy contributors.50  By electing our judges, we are essentially narrowing down 
the field of potential candidates to those who can either afford to finance their own 
campaign or secure financing from outside sources.51   
D.  Judicial Elections Are Incompatible With a Strong Judiciary 
While Canon 5 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct specifically addresses the 
issue of judicial candidates,52 Canon 2 is instructive on the issue of impropriety,53 
                                                                
49REPORT, supra note 4, at 24 (quoting Justice Joseph Grodin). 
50Id. at 24.  
To the extent that money is a more reliable proxy for determining who will win an 
election than who is most qualified to hold judicial office, there is legitimate cause for 
concern that privately funded judicial campaigns may limit access to judicial office for 
all candidates, of color or otherwise, who derive their support from less affluent 
communities that are unlikely to make significant financial contributions to judicial 
races. 
Id. 
51Id.  This problem will worsen as the cost of judicial campaigns continues to rise and 
candidates are forced to spend more of their own money on elections.  Positions on the bench 
may become limited to those who can purchase them or are willing to take out personal loans 
to finance their campaigns. 
52MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990).   
All Judges and Candidates (1) Except as authorized in Sections 5B(2), 5C(1), and 
5C(3), a judge or a candidate for election or appointment to judicial office shall not: 
(a) act as a leader or hold an office in a political organization; (b) publicly 
endorse or publicly oppose another candidate for public office; (c) make speeches on 
behalf of a political organization; (d) attend political gatherings; or (e) solicit funds 
for, pay an assessment to or make a contribution to a political organization or 
candidate, or purchase tickets for political party dinners or other functions.  (2) A 
judge shall resign from judicial office upon becoming a candidate for a non-judicial 
office either in a primary or in a general election, except that the judge may continue 
to hold judicial office while being a candidate for election to or serving as a delegate 
in a state constitutional convention if the judge is otherwise permitted by law to do so. 
(3) A candidate for a judicial office: (a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to 
judicial office and act in a manner consistent with the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary, and shall encourage members of the candidate’s family to adhere to the 
same standards of political conduct in support of the candidate as apply to the 
candidate. (b) shall prohibit employees and officials who serve at the pleasure of the 
candidate, and shall discourage other employees and officials subject to the 
candidate’s direction and control from doing on the candidate’s behalf what the 
candidate is prohibited from doing under the Sections of this Canon; (c) except to the 
extent permitted by Section 5C(2), shall not authorize or knowingly permit any other 
person to do for the candidate what the candidate is prohibited from doing under the 
Sections of this Canon; (d) shall not: (i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office 
other than the  faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; (ii) make 
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court; or (iii) knowingly 
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stating that a judge should conduct himself in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the judiciary.  The commentary to Canon 2 outlines a test that should 
be used in determining whether conduct will create the appearance of impropriety.54  
“The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in 
reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial 
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.”55  Indeed, 
even though the Model Code of Judicial Conduct admits to the necessity of 
fundraising in judicial campaigns in those states utilizing popular election, it does so 
only grudgingly.56  Judicial elections create the appearance of impropriety in the 
                                                          
misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the 
candidate or an opponent; (e) may respond to personal attacks or attacks on the 
candidate’s record as long as the response does not violate Section 5A(3)(d).  
B.  Candidates seeking appointment to judicial or other governmental office.  (1) 
A candidate for appointment to judicial office or a judge seeking other governmental 
office shall not solicit or accept funds, personally or through a committee or otherwise, 
to support his or her candidacy.  (2) A candidate for appointment to judicial office or a 
judge seeking other governmental office shall not engage in any political activity to 
secure the appointment except that: (a) such persons may: (i) communicate with the 
appointing authority, including any selection or nominating commission or other 
agency designated to screen candidates; (ii) seek support or endorsement for the 
appointment from organizations that regularly make recommendations for 
reappointment or appointment to the office, and from individuals to the extent 
requested or required by those specified in Section 5B(2)(a); and (iii) provide to those 
specified in Sections 5B(2)(a)(i) and 5B(2)(a)(ii) information as to his or her 
qualifications for the office; (b) a non-judge candidate for appointment to judicial 
office may, in addition, unless otherwise prohibited by law: (i) retain an office in a 
political organization, (ii) attend political gatherings, and (iii) continue to pay ordinary 
assessments and ordinary contributions to a political organization or candidate and 
purchase tickets for political party dinners or other functions.  C.  Judges and 
candidates subject to public election. (1) A judge or a candidate subject to public 
election may, except as prohibited by law: (a) at any time: (i) purchase tickets for and 
attend political gatherings; (ii) identify himself or herself as a member of a political 
party; and (iii)contribute to a political organization; (b) when a candidate for election 
(i) speak to gatherings on his or her own behalf; (ii)appear in newspaper, television 
and other media advertisements supporting his or her candidacy; (iii) distribute 
pamphlets and other promotional campaign literature supporting his or her candidacy; 
and (iv) publicly endorse or publicly oppose other candidates for the same judicial 
office in a public election in which the judge or judicial candidate is running. 
Id. 
53MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1990).  “A judge shall respect and 
comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”  Id. 
54Id. 
55Id.  
56The commentary to Canon 5C(2) states: 
[t]here is a legitimate concern about a judge’s impartiality when parties whose 
interests may come before a judge, or the lawyer who represents such parties, are 
known to have made contributions to the election campaigns of judicial candidates.  
This is among the reasons that merit selection of judges is a preferable manner in 
which to select the judiciary.   
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public’s eyes by forcing judicial candidates to request money from the very 
individuals and businesses which will either be appearing before the judge or have an 
interest that will be before the judge.  This appearance, whether real or simply 
perceived, will continue to erode public confidence in the judiciary.  Further, judicial 
elections will likely keep qualified individuals from seeking the bench.  Ohio needs 
to reform the method used to select judges. 
III.  ALTERNATIVES TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
A.  Public Financing of Judicial Elections 
Although not a replacement for judicial elections, the American Bar 
Association57 has called for the public financing of judicial elections in order to 
curtail the inflow of money from special interests and those who have business 
before the court.58  In response to the inherent risk that campaign contributions 
would create a “quid pro quo benefits … exchange,”59 the Justice For Hire campaign 
has suggested public financing of judicial elections.60  Similarly, North Carolina 
recently passed the Judicial Campaign Reform Act, which provides for the public 
financing of judicial elections.61  Proponents of public financing suggest that it will 
protect judicial candidates from the “corruptive effects of political donations.”62  
However, public financing is completely ineffective in curtailing the spending of 
special interest groups.63  It is likely that contributors who would normally have 
given the money directly to a candidate will instead fund independent campaigns 
either in support of their candidate or against the opponent.64   
An example of the ineffectiveness of public financing of judicial elections is 
Wisconsin, where Supreme Court races are partially publicly funded by a $1.00 state 
                                                          
Id. 
57REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.  (The American Bar Association supports merit selection as 
being the best method to select judges and offers public financing of judicial elections merely 
as a method of making judicial elections better); see also id. at 8.  “The Commission 
recommends that states consider financing contested judicial elections with public funds, but 
does so with its eyes open to the reality that public financing offers no panacea to the 
problems that pervade judicial campaign finance in many states.”   
58Id.   
The Commission recommends that states which select judges in contested elections 
finance judicial elections with public funds, as a means to address the perceived 
impropriety associated with judicial candidates accepting private contributions from 
individuals and organizations interested in the outcomes of cases those candidates may 
later decide as judges. 
59Justice for Hire, supra note 2, at 26. 
60Id. 
61The National Pulse, Footing the Bill for Judicial Campaigns, 1 No. 40 A.B.A. J. E-
REPORT 1 (Oct. 18, 2002). 
62Justice for Hire, supra note 2, at 27. 
63Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 297. 
64REPORT, supra note 4, at 36. 
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tax return check-off.65 Public financing has not proved to be the boon for which 
proponents of public financing had hoped.66  In order to receive funds from the state, 
Supreme Court candidates must have raised less than $11,000 in $100 increments or 
less; and the maximum public grant is $97,031 out of a maximum allowable of 
$215,625.67  As a result, Supreme Court candidates may still raise up to fifty-five 
percent of the funds for their campaign.68  Further, taxpayer participation in the state 
tax check-off system has declined from 19.9% in 1979 to 8.7% in 1998, with the 
result being that the fund has been unable to provide the $97,031 in grants authorized 
to the candidates.69  As a result, in 1999, a candidate for a Supreme Court seat 
declined to accept the public funding and the spending limits that go along with 
accepting the public funds.70  This declination authorized the incumbent to exceed 
the spending limit as well, which resulted in combined spending of over $1.2 
million.71  Opponents of public financing also argue that the money a judicial 
candidate would receive through public financing would be simply a “drop in the 
bucket.”72   
B.  Appointive System 
Originally, appointment was the preferred method of selecting judges in 
America.73  The model of selecting judges most Americans are familiar with is the 
federal appointive model.74  “Under the federal model, the President appoints a judge 
subject only to the advice and consent of the Senate.”75  Federal judges are given a 
                                                                
65A check-off system requires a taxpayer to check a box on his or her tax return in order to 
contribute some amount to the fund.  Although check-off systems do not generally require the 
taxpayer to forgo any portion of his or her return for overpayment, many taxpayers do not 
understand this and choose not to check the box. 
66REPORT, supra note 4, at 28. 
67Id. at 28-29.  
68Id. at 29. 
69Id.   
70REPORT, supra note 4, at 29-30. 
71Id. 
72Id.  While the funding candidates may receive through public financing may not be 
simply a “drop in the bucket,” the candidates would not likely receive all of their funding 
through public financing and would therefore be forced to seek contributions from the 
community.  
73Judicial Appointments White Paper Task Force, supra note 47, at 356 .   
In the case of federal judges, of course, this meant the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  In eight of the original thirteen states, however, the 
appointment power was given directly to the legislature, the other five opting for a 
model similar to the federal system: appointment by the governor subject to 
confirmation by the legislature. 
Id. 
74Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 300. 
75Id. 
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lifetime appointment.  Lifetime appointment was perceived by the framers and 
ratifying states as an important element in assuring a republican government.76 As 
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 stated:  
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the 
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill 
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular 
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and 
which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more 
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion 
dangerous innovation in the government, and serious oppressions of the 
minor party in the community.77   
Despite the success of the federal model, no state selects its judges in the exact 
manner as in the federal government.78  Currently only four states utilize legislative 
appointment.79  By the time Andrew Jackson became President, many states had 
begun to move toward an elected judiciary.80  The Hamiltonian desire for an 
independent judiciary was giving way to a concern that appointed judges were not 
accountable to the general public, as evidenced by the fact that the first twenty-nine 
states that entered the Union opted for an appointed judiciary, but most of the states 
joining the Union after the Jackson presidency chose to implement an elected 
judiciary rather than an appointed one.81  Opponents have suggested that legislative 
                                                                
76Judicial Appointments White Paper Task Force, supra note 47, at 357.   
77THE FEDERALIST PAPERS READER, supra note 45, at 160. 
78Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 300.  
Several states, however, have adopted a method that resembles the federal system.  In 
Maine, for example, the governor appoints judges subject to confirmation by a 
legislative committee whose decision is reviewable by the senate.  At the conclusion 
of a seven-year term, the governor may reappoint the judge.  In New Jersey, the 
governor appoints judges subject to senate confirmation.  New Jersey judges serve an 
initial seven-year term and then may be granted life tenure by the governor.  Virginia 
appoints its judges for 12-year terms through a majority vote of the members of each 
house of its General Assembly.  Several state that elect their judges fill judicial 
vacancies by gubernatorial appointment until the next election.  Only four states, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island grant their judges 
lifetime tenure. 
 
States employing some form of merit selection for initial terms include Alaska, 
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New 
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Vermont, and Wyoming.  California has a hybrid method of judicial selection 
featuring some characteristics of a pure appointive system and others of a merit 
system. 
79Judicial Appointments White Paper Task Force, supra note 47, at 357.  The four states 
are Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia and Connecticut. 
80Id. at 359. 
81Id.  The first state to provide for direct election of appellate judges was Mississippi in 
1832.  Id. 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss1/6
2002-03] OHIO’S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS 137 
appointment fosters “partisan politics, the possibility of cronyism, and the limitations 
imposed by the fact that it is likely that there will be only a narrow field of 
candidates known to the legislators.”82  A majority of states now utilize some 
variation of merit selection.83 
C.  Merit Selection 
In 1940, Missouri became the first state in the nation to adopt a merit selection 
plan for the selection of state judges.84  Since 1940, the issue of judicial selection has 
become a constant source of debate throughout the states.85  Merit selection, a variant 
of the appointive system, is now one of the most prevalent methods for selecting 
judges in the United States.86  Merit selection is now employed by at least thirty-
three states.87  Under the “Missouri Plan,” a commission88 would nominate three 
candidates for every state judicial vacancy, and the governor would then appoint 
from the list.89  The appointed judge would then have to face the voters in a retention 
election during the next general election.90  Proponents of merit selection suggest that 
merit selection removes politics from the selection process, removes the need for 
campaign contributions, and allows for the selection of more qualified judges.91   
While merit selection plans such as the Missouri Plan are a step in the correct 
direction, merit selection fails to address some of the primary concerns facing 
judicial selection.  Despite not having to initially face voters in a general election, 
thus saving judicial candidates from being forced to take campaign contributions 
from individuals and businesses likely to have an agenda before the court, merit 
selection requires that the judge face the voters in a retention election.  Even though 
the judge will run unopposed in a retention election, the same issues arise as a result 
of having to face the voters.92  Marianna Brown Bettman, formerly an Ohio appellate 
judge now teaching at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, argues, “a real 
problem has emerged with retention elections.  Some have become just as unseemly 
as the [2000 campaign between Justice Alice Robie Resnick and Judge Terrence 
                                                                
82Behrens & Silverman, supra note 8, at 360. 
83Id. 
84Philip L. Dubois, Voter Responses to Court Reform: Merit Judicial Selection on the 
Ballot, 73 JUDICATURE 238, 239 (1990). 
85Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The 
Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 31-34 (May 1986). 
86See generally Harry O. Lawson, Methods of Judicial Selection, 75 MICH. B.J. 20 (1996). 
87Judicial Appointments White Paper Task Force, supra note 47, at 357. 
88Id. at 362.  Under the Missouri plan, the commission was composed of lawyers selected 
by the bar, laypersons selected by the governor, and a sitting judge.  Id. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom, 41 
S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1209 ( 2000). 
92Judicial Appointments White Paper Task Force, supra note 47, at 363-364. 
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O’Donnell]—only the stealth attack groups don’t even have to put forth their own 
candidate.”93  She suggests that the retention decision should be made by the same 
commission that made the initial recommendation, rather than by the voters in an 
election.94  Bettman has hit on one of the key failings of traditional merit selection 
plans. 
Retention elections under traditional merit selection plans are not the answer for 
Ohio as they subject the judge to rigors and expectations similar to partisan elections.  
Likewise, public financing of judicial elections does not provide the answer for the 
problem of judicial elections in Ohio.  Ohio needs to adopt an appointive method for 
selecting judges.  Judicial reform has been suggested in Ohio before without much 
success, however.   
IV.  OHIO’S REFORM EFFORTS 
Ohio had the issue of judicial reform on the ballot in November 1987.  Issue 
Three, as it was known, would have eliminated election of state appellate judges and 
established thirteen nominating commissions responsible for submitting candidates 
to the appointing authority for appointment to the twelve district courts of appeals 
and the Supreme Court.95  Equal numbers of lawyers and laymen would have sat on 
the nominating commissions, with the lawyers being nominated for the commission 
by the district courts, and the governor nominating the laymen for the commission.96  
The commissions would be responsible for screening potential candidates and, when 
there was an opening, would forward three names to the governor who would then 
appoint one individual from the list submitted.97  Under the Issue Three plan, the 
appointed judges would then be required to run unopposed in a retention election.  
To remain on the bench, the judge would then be required to have received at least a 
fifty-five percent approval vote.98  The appointed judge would then be forced to face 
the voters in similar retention elections every six years.99   
The principle proponents of Issue Three were the Ohio Bar Association (OBA) 
and the League of Women Voters (OLWV).100  The OBA and the OLWV argued that 
an appointed judge would hold no electoral allegiance and thus would not be 
beholden to any one individual or group.101  The OBA further advocated that moving 
                                                                
93Marianna Brown Bettman, A Better Way to Pick Judges:  Ohioans Should Reconsider 
Merit Selection, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 30, 2000, at 11B.  
94Id. 
95Felice & Kilwein, supra note 33, at 194. 
96Id. 
97Id. 
98Id. 
99Id. 
100Felice & Kilwein, supra note 33, at 194-95.  The OBA and the League of Women 
Voters authored Issue Three.  At least 40 other groups backed Issue Three including the Ohio 
Congress of Parents and Teachers, the Ohio Council of Churches.  Id. 
101Id. at 195.  They argued that elected judges, “with an eye towards his or her next 
campaign, is more likely to allow his or her decisions to be affected by the interests of 
constituents.”   
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to a merit selection plan would likely do away with Ohio’s “name game.”102  The 
OBA also worried that the local political parties rather than the public as a whole 
held the key role in selecting judges.103  The proponents used the media in order to 
get the message of merit selection across to the public,104 focusing mainly on 
television ads, but also including newspaper advertisements.105  They also created an 
information sheet called FACT, which attempted to list the problems inherent in the 
electoral system and offered merit selection as a means to fixing the judicial 
selection system.106   
The major opponent to Issue Three was the Ohio chapter of the American 
Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL/CIO).107  The Ohio 
Republican Party as well as the Ohio Democratic Party also opposed Issue Three.108  
The opponents aired a series of advertisements that suggested that Issue Three would 
take away the public’s right to vote.109  The opponents emphasized the bipartisan 
opposition to Issue Three, and criticized the complicated structure of the proposal.110  
Once the opposition portrayed Issue Three as taking away the general public’s right 
to vote, Issue Three was destined to fail.111  Indeed, Issue Three failed by a two-to-
                                                                
102Id. at 196.  This ‘name game’ is an interesting phenomenon that increases the electoral 
success of Ohio politicians who have particular last names, for example, Brown and Sweeney.  
Thus the ballots of many of Ohio’s major elections are filled with these common names.  
Weisenberg argued that the potential exists that these ‘name game’ candidates have minimal 
qualifications for office their politically correct name, a problem he felt is exacerbated by the 
low level of information the average voter has for his or her choices in judicial elections. 
103Id.  (Explaining that the parties play the major role in determining who the judicial 
candidates would be with the public then merely choosing between those already selected by 
the parties). 
104Felice & Kilwein, supra note 33, at 197-98.   
105Id. 
106Id.   
The FACT pamphlet identified the following as examples of the problems with the 
current electoral method of selection of judges: 
1. it virtually forces judicial candidates to conduct outrageously expensive political 
campaigns.  2. it discourages good candidates from seeking judgeships and encourages 
politicians to use judgeships as patronage plums.  3. it denies citizens the information 
they need to make sound judicial choices.  4. it turns judges into politicians and 
fundraisers.  5. in effect, the current method deprives Ohioans of their right to an 
impartial judicial system. 
Id. 
107Id. at 197. 
108Id. 
109Felice & Kilwein, supra note 33, at 198. 
110Id. 
111Id. at 199.  The failure can be attributed to several factors.  According to Weisenberg 
these were: the complexity of the issue, the effective job that the opponents did in framing this 
issue as one that solely involved ‘the right to vote,’ the difficulties that occurred in collecting 
the required petition signatures and the battles that took place in the courts to validate them, 
the weakness of the proponents’ media ads, the nature of fund-raising capabilities of grass-
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one count statewide and in eighty of Ohio’s eighty-eight counties.112  After the 
failure of Issue Three in 1987, the proponents of the issue expressed pessimism as to 
the future of merit selection in Ohio.113   
V.  OHIO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ON THE AIRWAVES 
A.  The 2000 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court 
“Lest you’re worried…that Ohio might actually witness a statewide campaign 
that is not covered in muck, fret not.  The race between O’Donnell and Resnick 
already is vying for the title of Ohio’s ugliest in 2000.”114  A commercial run during 
the 2000 race between Alice Robie Resnick and Terrence O’Donnell asked the 
viewer: “Is justice for sale in Ohio?”115  An independent activist group called 
Citizens for a Strong Ohio, in opposition to Justice Alice Robie Resnick’s campaign 
for the Ohio Supreme Court, produced this ad.116  Although the ad was labeled as 
issue advocacy rather than express advocacy, the emphasis was clearly on the 
candidate.117  John Green, director of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at 
the University of Akron, explained that while the advertisements sponsored by 
Citizens for a Strong Ohio may “technically abide by legal restrictions . . . very 
clearly, the intent of the ads is to influence people’s choices of candidates.”118  
Indeed, Justice Resnick remarked that she was “not a vindictive person, but they 
really did attack my honor and integrity.”119  Despite the ads that suggested that 
                                                          
roots organizations like labor unions, and the fact that the major political parties and organized 
labor were opposed to the reform proposal. 
112Felice & Kilwein, supra note 33, at 199. 
113Id. at 200. 
114Joe Hallett, Ohio Supreme Court Race Features Outsider Mud, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Ohio), June 11, 2000, at 3B. The article concludes, “Maintaining judicial independence may 
be difficult after a campaign already noteworthy for its vitriol.”  Id. 
115Darrel Rowland & James Bradshaw, State Elections Panel Reaffirms Legality of Anti-
Resnick TV Ad, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Oct. 27, 2000, at 1D. 
116Baker, supra note 25, at n.1. 
117Id.  Justice Resnick was confronted with negative ads in previous judicial races as well.  
Judge Harper ran an ad during their race which read: 
On the Ohio Supreme Court, one Justice has a problem.  It’s money.  Most of 
Resnick’s money comes from just one place, the plaintiff lawyers who sue, sue, sue.  
Over $300,000 just from them.  This small group of using lawyers wants Resnick with 
her liberal rulings to make it easier for them to collect millions in fees.  It’s time for a 
change to Judge Sara Harper.  Recommended, endorsed, highly rated, twenty years as 
a Judge, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel.  Judge Sara Harper. 
Id. at n.3.  
118William Hershey & Mike Wagner, Group Files Complaint About Anti-Resnick Ads, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Ohio), Oct. 18, 2000, at 1A.  John Green added that he felt it was an 
embarrassment that Governor Taft had made fund-raising telephone calls on behalf of Citizens 
for a Strong Ohio. 
119Mike Wagner, Despite Negative Ads, Resnick Retains Seat, DAYTON DAILY NEWS 
(Ohio), Nov. 8, 2000, at 1A. 
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Justice Resnick’s vote could be bought, she soundly defeated Judge Terrence 
O’Donnell of the Eighth District Ohio Court of Appeals.120  The attack ads during the 
2000 campaign became so heinous that Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer called for the 
legislature to require disclosure.121  Despite Chief Justice Moyer’s call to consider 
appointment of appellate level judges, the idea found stiff opposition in the Ohio 
legislature.122   
Ohio Senate President Richard Finan announced that he was opposed to the idea 
of appointment.123  The Ohio Democratic Party Chairman at the time, David Leland, 
announced that the re-election of Justice Resnick was among the great victories for 
his party during the 2000 election year.124  Not surprisingly, Robert Bennett, 
Chairman of the Ohio Republican Party, backed a merit selection plan similar to that 
proposed by Chief Justice Moyer.125  Reginald S. Jackson Jr., then president of the 
Ohio State Bar Association, stated that he felt the ads clearly conveyed the message 
that justice was for sale to the highest bidder.126  The 2000 election was bad, but 
Ohio would see worse with the 2002 campaign. 
B.  The 2002 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court 
“If you liked the big-money, ideological free-for-all that was the 2000 Ohio 
Supreme Court race, you’ll love the way things are shaping up this year.”127  
Campaigning for the 2002 elections for the Ohio Supreme Court began early in 
January 2002 when the Ohio Democratic Party picked its two candidates for the fall 
race.128  Judge Tim Black declared in response to being selected by the Ohio 
                                                                
120T. C. Brown, Top Judge Wants Ad Campaign Backers Identified, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Dec. 12, 2000, at 5B. 
121Id.  Those who contributed to “independent” efforts were able to remain anonymous.  
Moyer also called for Ohio to consider public financing and suggested that appellate level 
judges should be elected.  Under Moyer’s plan, judges would be appointed by a commission 
and would face retention elections. 
122Julie Carr Smyth, Legislators Uninterested in Appointed Judges: Chief Justice Seeking 
Allies to Push Idea, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 18, 2001, at 2B. 
123Id.  “Brett Buerck, chief of staff for House Speaker Larry Householder, said the issue 
wasn’t even ‘on the radar screen’ of top legislative priorities.” 
124Id. 
125Id.  Bennett favored gubernatorial appointment rather than a commission based 
appointment. 
126Joe Hallett, Officials Ponder a Vaccine for Vicious Judicial Campaigns, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Ohio), Jan. 31, 2001, at 2B.  Chief Justice Moyer stated:  
Dissent is part of the American spirit, but to extract political revenge, to threaten the 
tenure of a judge over a decision with which some may disagree, places the judge in 
the same political position as a mayor or a legislator.  It suggests that judges owe some 
members of their community something other than the impartial resolution of disputes. 
Id. 
127David Bennett, Court in the Balance, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUSINESS, Jan. 28, 2002. 
128Editorial, Court Seats Don’t Belong to Groups, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Ohio), Jan. 16, 
2002, at 6A. 
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Democratic Party:  “This is labor’s seat.”129  Judge Black admitted that he was 
attempting to motivate a particular set of supporters.130  Similar to the 2000 election, 
issue advocacy groups made their mark.131  A group called Informed Citizens of 
Ohio132 ran “issue ads” aimed at supporting both Justice Evelyn Stratton in her re-
election bid and Lt. Gov. Maureen O’Connor in her bid for the Ohio Supreme 
Court.133  One ad run by Informed Citizens of Ohio depicts a young couple walking 
into their obstetrician’s office only to find it empty.  The narrator states: “Little by 
little doctors are disappearing from the state of Ohio.  Disappearing because 
frivolous lawsuits are forcing them to leave their practices.  And when it’s your 
doctor, where do you go?  Justice Evelyn Stratton’s record shows that she 
understands the need to stop lawsuit abuse and now so do you.”134   
Consumers for a Fair Court ran another example of “issue advocacy.”  This ad 
was against Justice Stratton.  The ad said:  
Their mothers took a drug called DES to prevent miscarriages.  More than 
400,000 women in Ohio, and when their daughters developed a form of 
cancer caused by DES, they asked Ohio’s Supreme Court for justice.  But 
Eve Stratton said no.  Eve Stratton said she had sympathy for the victims, 
but she gave sanctuary to the big drug companies.  Their mothers took 
DES to prevent miscarriages, but Eve Stratton’s ruling is a miscarriage of 
justice.135   
This ad suggested that Justice Stratton made her ruling based on a partiality 
toward big business rather than on any sound legal basis.  An ad run by the citizens 
for an Independent Court advocated on behalf of Democrats Tim Black and Janet 
Burnside.  The ad stated:  
                                                                
129Id. 
130Id.  “Asked to expound about the remark, Judge Black says he’ll, of course, be ‘bound 
by the law,’ that he has no ‘preconceived’ notions, that his comments were meant to motivate 
Democrats and labor to support him.  But the horse is out of the barn.”  Id. 
131Opinion, Mocking the Voters Once Again, a Cynical Attempt to Influence Judicial 
Elections Threatens To Sink the Candidates It Seeks to Promote, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), 
Sept. 9, 2002, at B6. 
132Id.  Informed Citizens of Ohio was formed by David Brennan, an Akron businessman 
and former Ohio Republican Party executive director.  Id. 
133Id. 
134At http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/buyingtime_2002/storyboard_2002_ 
index.html.  (Last visited Jan. 18, 2004)  Another ad run by the Informed Citizens of Ohio 
shows two presumably plaintiff lawyers talking about their practice.  They state: “At Brady 
and Lawrence we help you collect on your lawsuit.  Say you’re stealing a hubcap and the car 
starts rolling over you hand.  Well that could hurt and you could sue!  Say you’re washing 
your poodle and you pop her in the microwave and she dies.  That could hurt.  And you could 
sue!”  The announcer then says: “Frivolous lawsuits cost your family $2500 a year.  Justice 
Evelyn Stratton’s record shows that she protects your family by fighting lawsuit abuse.”  Id. 
135Id.  Another ad by Citizens for an Independent Court stated, “We need Justices who 
protect people, not corporations.”  Id 
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Their side: Maureen O’Connor and Eve Stratton put large corporations 
ahead of working families.  Our side: Judges Tim Black and Janet 
Burnside will hold large corporations accountable for wrongdoing.  Their 
side: Eve Stratton sided with the big insurance companies ninety-four 
percent of the time.  Our side: Judges Black and Burnside will put our 
courts back on the side of workers and families.  Judges Tim Black and 
Janet Burnside.  They’re on our side.136   
This ad clearly suggested that justices should take sides rather than upholding the 
law, regardless of their personal political bent.  During the 2002 judicial elections, 
Ohio was subjected to more television ads than in any other state with a Supreme 
Court judicial race.137  The amount and nature of the ads spurred many prominent 
individuals to call for change.138  As Chief Justice Moyer said in reference to the 
large sums of money spent by independent organization: “We have been subjected to 
the dark side of democracy.”139  Advertisements during the 2000 and 2002 judicial 
campaigns evidenced the need for reform in Ohio. 
VI.  JUSTICE UN-GAGGED: TIME TO TAKE SIDES 
In June 2002, the United States Supreme Court pushed open the door allowing 
room for even more judicial partiality in state elections.140  In the case before the 
Court, Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, Minnesota had adopted a canon of 
judicial conduct that prohibited a judicial candidate in a state election from 
announcing his or her personal views on a disputed legal or political issue.141  A 
candidate for the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Gregory Wersal, challenged the 
announce clause, arguing that it violated his right to free speech.142  Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion held that Minnesota could not keep a judicial candidate from 
“announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”143  
                                                                
136Id. 
137Torry, supra note 11.  
A study shows that candidates and special-interest organizations spent at least $5.6 
million on television ads in Ohio—far more than the combined total in the other eight 
states with TV ads for Supreme Court races.  The report…reveals that Ohio residents 
were deluged with 29 commercials that aired more than 13,000 times, compared with 
eight ads that aired fewer than 3,600 times in Alabama, where the second-highest 
amount of money for ads was spent. 
Id. 
138Id.  Geri Palast, executive director of Justice at Stake Campaign aid: “And when a 
state’s judicial elections are targeted by special interests, courts find themselves caught in a 
‘perfect storm’ of big money and partisan pressure.”  Alfred P. Carlton, president of the 
American Bar Association said: “This spending brings questions of a candidates allegiance, 
and with respect to judges, whether or not they can be impartial on the bench.”  Id. 
139Id. 
140See generally, Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
141Id. 
142Id. 
143Id. at 788.   
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The Court applied strict scrutiny, which requires that a statute have a compelling 
government interest that is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.  The Court held 
that the statute was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the government’s 
interest in the impartiality of its judiciary.144  The Court further held that the 
announce clause was not a compelling government interest.145  The Court reasoned it 
was not a compelling government interest since it is extremely difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to find a judge who does not have a pre-conception about the law.146  
However, in separate dissents, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens 
argued that judicial elections are inherently different from other types of elections, 
and that the burden Minnesota placed on judicial campaign speech was permissible 
in order to meet the compelling interest of maintaining an independent judiciary.147 
Despite the reasoning in the dissents, the Supreme Court effectively “endorsed an 
anything-goes, political-free-for-all system of electing judges.”148  Roy A. Schotland, 
a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center said the decision “shows 
how unrealistic five justices can be about what happens in judicial election 
campaigns, and also—ironically—about how much judges differ from legislators and 
others who run for office.”149  Schotland believes, as a result of the decision in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, that the quality of judicial candidate pools 
will diminish since potentially good judges will be less willing to seek election.150   
After the ruling was announced, Judge Tim Black, candidate for the Ohio 
Supreme Court opined:  “It makes judges much more susceptible to being politicians 
than we’ve ever been before.  It will change the tenor and tone of judicial 
campaigns.”151  Lt. Gov. Maureen O’ Connor, Black’s Republican opponent, 
commented:  “If my personal opinion on a topic is of interest to a voter or group, I 
certainly would express it.”152  The unfortunate result of the Supreme Court’s ruling 
will be a further politicizing of the already mired judicial election process.  While 
candidates for legislative and executive offices are representatives of the people, and 
thus may make promises and can be held accountable for them if they do not follow-
through on their promises, judges are not representatives of the people.153  Judges 
                                                                
144Id. at 765. 
145Id. 
146Id. 
147Id. at 797-808. 
148Editorial, High Court Invites Chaos in Judicial Races, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Ohio), 
July 5, 2002, at 10A.  The editorial goes on to say: “It’s as though the court turned loose a 
five-justice wrecking crew on judicial integrity and independence.  As a result, Ohio needs 
judicial election reform more urgently than ever.”  Id 
149Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, 39 AM. JUDGES ASS’N CT. 
REV. 8, at 8 (Spring, 2002). 
150Id. 
151Randy Ludlow, Court Ruling Opens up Judge Races, CINCINNATI POST (Ohio), July 15, 
2002, at 1A. 
152Id. 
153Marianna Brown Bettman, Judges’ Free Speech, CINCINNATI POST (Ohio), July 29, 
2002, at 8A. 
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must make decisions based on the law and the facts of each specific case before 
them, not on campaign positions or their own personal views on controversial 
issues.154   
VII.  THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STATES THE CASE 
Recognizing the need for a more cohesive statement on the qualifications of 
judges and the ability to select judges with the proper qualifications, in 1999, the 
American Bar Association (ABA)155 established a “Commission on State Judicial 
Selection Standards (Commission).”156  The ABA charged the Commission to draft 
model standards for selecting state court judges.157  The Commission took the stand 
that financial contributions to judicial elections are a major reason for “distrust in the 
integrity and independence of the judicial systems.”158  The Commission then made 
recommendations for improving judicial selection, which in turn will improve the 
public’s perception of the judiciary.159  The Commission started with a two-part 
thesis that suggested:  1) that there is an implied covenant with the public that those 
who are selected to be judges will have the qualifications necessary to administer 
justice; and 2) that there should be some deliberative body that screens judicial 
candidates to ensure that the standards are met.160   
                                                                
154Id. 
155ABA Comm. on State Judicial Selection Standards, Standards on State Judicial 
Selection, at vi.  (July 2000) [hereinafter Commission]. 
How do we identify individuals with the requisite qualifications to assure us that they 
will perform the judicial task with distinction and, given the reality that no one 
becomes a judge without being touched by the political brush, how do we assure that 
only those with the requisite qualities become judges?  That is our task. 
Id. 
156Id.  The members of the Commission included Edward W. Madeira, Jr., Patricia G. 
Brady, Shelley A. Longmuir, Hon. Thomas J. Moyer, Hon. Cara Lee Neville, Andrea Sheridan 
Ordin, Joseph P. Tomain, Marna S. Tucker, Hon. James A. Wynn, Jr., James J. Alfini, Jarrett 
Gable, Luke Bierman, and Eileen C. Gallagher.  Id. 
157Id. at vi.  The Commission was funded by a grant from the Open Society Institute.   
158Commission, supra note 154, at x. 
159Id.  
160Id. at 1. 
There is a two-part thesis for our recommended standards.  First: whatever the system 
for selection of state trial and appellate judges, there is an implied covenant with the 
people that the judges selected will be persons who have demonstrated by well-
defined and well recognized qualifications their fitness for judicial office.  Second: 
there should be a credible, deliberative body that, pursuant to published criteria and 
procedures, finds that persons considered for judicial office are qualified, by learning, 
experience and temperament, to decide the cases that come before them impartially 
and in accordance with the law. 
Id. 
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A.  The ABA Judicial Selection and Retention Criteria 
The Commission recommended that, at a minimum, a judicial candidate should 
be a member of the Bar of the highest court of a state for ten years and, further, that 
the candidate should have been actively practicing or teaching during those ten 
years.161  In addition, the judicial candidate should be of high moral character 
including a reputation for honesty.162  Further, the candidate must be professionally 
competent, and have a judicial temperament conducive to the administration of 
justice.163  While the standards supplied by the Commission outline the type of 
individual we as a public should be looking for in a potential jurist, the standards by 
themselves do not ensure that potential candidates will volunteer any information 
about themselves or their background which would put them outside of the 
standards.  Thus, enforcement of the standards becomes a key ingredient to the 
effectiveness of the standards. 
B.  Primary Actors in Judicial Selection as Outlined by the Commission 
The Commission suggests that primary actors in the judicial selection process 
should be a judicial eligibility commission, a judicial nominating commission, and 
the appointing authority.164  The Commission sets out what the role of each primary 
actor should be in the selection process, with the first actor being the judicial 
eligibility commission.165   
1.  Judicial Eligibility Commission 
The role of the Judicial Eligibility Commission would be to review the 
qualifications of judicial candidates and forward its findings to the appointing 
authority, endorsing authority, or the electorate.  The Judicial Eligibility Commission 
would be required to remain independent from appointing and endorsing authorities, 
as well as from any inappropriate influence in order to express the commission’s 
opinions about the judicial candidates based only on the commission’s independent 
findings.166   Establishing the independence of the eligibility commission begins with 
the selection of the individual members of the commission.   
While the Commission states that there is no rigid model, the Commission 
suggests that the judicial eligibility commission should be composed of both lawyers 
                                                                
161Id. at 7 
162Commission, supra note 154, at 7. 
163Id. Under the ABA standards, professional competence includes: “intellectual capacity, 
professional and persona judgment, writing and analytical ability, knowledge of the law and 
breadth of professional experience, including courtroom and trial experience.”  Judicial 
temperament includes: “a commitment to equal justice under law, freedom from bias, ability 
to decide issues according to law, courtesy and civility, open-mindedness and compassion.”  
The Commission further states that a judge should provide service to the law and contribute to 
the effective administration of justice.  Id. 
164Id. at 9-20  The Commission also puts emphasis on an endorsing authority and a 
retention evaluation body.  
165Id. at 9. 
166Commission, supra note 154, at 9-10. 
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and non-lawyers.167  The Commission gives an example of what a typical method of 
selecting the individual members might be by suggesting that the Governor select 
two non-lawyer members, the Legislature select two non-lawyer members, the 
Supreme Court select two lawyer members and the State Bar Association select three 
lawyer members.168  After the judicial eligibility commission’s members have been 
selected, a chair would be appointed by the governor and only vote to break a tie.169  
Individuals seeking judicial office would be required to submit their names, and all 
information they have available, consistent with the selection standards to the 
judicial eligibility commission.170  This disclosure by the judicial candidates would 
be extremely important to the overall effectiveness of the judicial eligibility 
commission as well as to the judicial selection process as a whole, including the 
public’s perception that the method of selecting judges is both non-partisan and free 
from any bias.171  Upon receipt of a judicial candidate’s information, either from the 
candidate or through an endorsing or appointing authority, the judicial eligibility 
commission should then carefully and fairly examine the information, and then 
determine whether the candidate is qualified based on the selection criteria; no 
candidate should be deemed qualified unless at a minimum the candidate meets the 
selection criteria.172  In order to further insulate the judicial eligibility commission 
from any bias or perception of bias, the commission should be funded and run at the 
state level with state funds.173   
2.  Judicial Nominating Commission 
Similar to the judicial eligibility commission, a judicial nominating commission’s 
role is also to screen judicial candidates and forward a list to an appointing authority.  
The Commission even states that if there is a judicial nominating commission that is 
effective and “operating satisfactorily as [a] credible, deliberative [body], there is no 
need for a Judicial Eligibility Commission.”174  The nominating commission should 
be:  1) independent, 2) have a member selection plan, which minimizes bias, and 3) 
have an open process, which also ensures the confidentiality of the judicial 
candidates.175  Just like the judicial eligibility commissioners, the nominating 
commissioners should actively recruit individuals for screening in order to expand 
the potential pool of good applicants since many qualified individuals will not seek a 
judgeship on their own.176  Like the judicial eligibility commission, after screening 
                                                                
167Id. 
168Id. at 10. 
169Id.  The Commission further suggests that no commissioner serve for more than two 
three-year terms and that the terms of the commissioners should be staggered.   
170Id. 
171Commission, supra note 154, at 8. 
172Id. at 10-11. 
173Id. at 11. 
174Id. at 9-10. 
175Id. at 12. 
176Commission, supra note 154, at 13. 
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the applicants to ensure they meet the established criteria, the judicial nominating 
commission should forward a list of names to the appointing authority.177 
3.  Appointing Authority 
The Appointing Authority’s primary goal is to ensure a qualified and independent 
judiciary.  The Appointing Authority is typically going to be the governor of the 
state, but could also be the legislature or the state supreme court.178  “The appointing 
authority should only appoint from [a] list [] of qualified candidates submitted to the 
appointing authority by either a judicial eligibility commission or a judicial 
nominating commission.”179  Similar to the recommendations of the Commission as 
to the eligibility and nominating commissions, the Commission suggests that the 
Appointing Authority utilize an open and regularized process.180  An open and 
regularized process “promotes objectivity by reducing the influence of inappropriate 
political pressures, and thereby adds legitimacy to the outcome.”181  The use of either 
a judicial eligibility or judicial nominating commission will lessen the effects of 
outside influences on the appointing authority since the appointing authority will 
only be able to appoint off of the list provided by one of the commissions.182   
4.  Retention Evaluation Bodies 
The Commission also discusses the use of retention evaluation bodies for the 
purpose of retention elections.183  In addition to the criteria for initial selection, the 
criteria to be used in evaluating judicial performance for the purposes of retention 
would be preparation, attentiveness and control of judicial proceedings, judicial 
                                                                
177Id. at 14. 
178Id. at 5. 
179Id. at 15. 
180Id. at 15. 
181Commission, supra note 154, at 16.  Further, an open and regularized process 
“heightens the likelihood of achieving the goals of a qualified, inclusive, and independent 
judiciary.  An open selection process will assist in the recruitment of a diverse candidate pool, 
thereby promoting the goal of achieving a judiciary that is representative of our society 
particularly in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, and age or other indicia of diversity.” 
182Id. at 16. 
183Id. at 17-18.  The Commission also discusses Endorsing Authorities.    
B.4: Endorsing Authority.  The primary goal of individuals or official bodies who are 
responsible for endorsing judicial candidates for election should be to facilitate the 
selection of qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary.  (a) Open, Regularized 
Process.  In endorsing judicial candidates, the endorsing authority should use an open, 
regularized process to review the qualifications of judicial candidates.  The endorsing 
authority should endorse only those candidates who appear on lists of qualified 
candidates submitted by the Judicial Eligibility Commission.  (b) Selection.  In 
reviewing the qualifications of candidates submitted by a Judicial Eligibility 
Commission, the endorsing authority should consider a broad range of publicly 
disclosed criteria.  (c) Use of a Judicial Eligibility Commission.  The endorsing 
authority should encourage the use of a Judicial Eligibility Commission. 
Id. 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss1/6
2002-03] OHIO’S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS 149 
management skills, courtesy to litigants, counsel and court personnel, public 
disciplinary sanctions, and the quality of judicial opinions.184  The Commission 
suggests that the retention body use surveys with questions that would elicit critical 
and specific responses, directed at those persons who had direct contact with the 
sitting judge.185  After the retention body has conducted the survey and evaluated the 
judges, the information should be disseminated to as much of the voting public as 
feasible.186   
The Commission on State Judicial Selection Standards delivered a set of 
standards that, if enforced, would improve the independence and quality of the state 
judiciary.  The key to the Commission’s suggestions is the use of either a judicial 
eligibility commission or a judicial nominating commission operating under a 
mandate to screen potential judicial candidates to ensure they meet the criteria set out 
as the minimum for judicial selection.  Under the Commission’s plan, the Appointing 
Authority would have a list of candidates who meet the qualifications, and the 
Appointing Authority may then make a selection without the appearance of any 
direct bias towards any one individual.   
VIII.  TOWARDS REFORM IN OHIO—A CALL BY CHIEF JUSTICE MOYER 
Speaking at the 2002 annual meeting of the Ohio State Bar Association, Chief 
Justice Moyer called for reform in the manner Ohio selects judges.187  Chief Justice 
Moyer expressed his hope that the citizens of Ohio will at some point become 
convinced that Ohio should change the method of selecting judges.188  However, he 
stated that the day had not yet come, and proceeded to outline eight actions189 he 
believed would move Ohio in the right direction.190  The first action Moyer suggested 
was to increase the length of term in office to at least eight years, which he felt 
would help achieve an appropriate balance between independence in the judge’s 
decision making and accountability to the voters as well as reducing the frequency 
that judges must engage in fundraising.191  The second action would be to increase 
the current six-year practice requirement to at least a ten-year practice 
requirement.192  The third action Moyer suggested was to adopt the American Bar 
Association’s Standards on Judicial Qualifications193 stating, “[s]ome voters 
                                                                
184Id. at 7. 
185Commission, supra note 154, at 19. 
186Id. at 20. 
187Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Ohio Bar 
Association (May 16, 2002), at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Communications_ 
Office/Speeches/2002/0516cjm.asp [hereinafter Speech].  (Last visited Feb. 9, 2003). 
188Id. 
189Id. 
190Id. 
191Speech, supra note 186. 
192Id.  He suggested that the ten year requirement be for trial courts and that appellate 
courts and the Supreme Court should have a requirement in excess of ten years.  See id. 
193Id. 
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acknowledge that in deciding between two judicial candidates, they flip a coin.  With 
the creation of qualification committees, the voters win—heads or tails.”194  He also 
suggested that more should be done to inform the voters about the candidates and 
that the General Assembly should adopt legislation requiring individuals and 
organizations to report their contributions.195  Moyer suggested that the Ohio 
Assembly should adopt H.B. 201, and work at utilizing campaign conduct 
committees.196  As a last action item, Chief Justice Moyer suggested that, if Ohio 
continues using the elective process to select justices for the Supreme Court, public 
funding of those elections should be considered.197 
Chief Justice Moyer’s plan, which utilizes the American Bar Standards for 
selection standards, is a step in the correct direction.  However, the Moyer plan is 
only a bridge between Ohio’s current electoral process of selecting judges and a 
more appointive method, which Moyer hopes will be implemented in Ohio’s 
future.198  According to Moyer, “[t]he election of judges in 2002 no longer ensures 
the independence and the perceived impartiality of the judiciary.  Campaign 
fundraising has created the misperception that fairness comes at a price.”199  We need 
to go further than the Moyer plan suggests by rejecting the popular election of judges 
and instituting an appointive method for the selection of judges in Ohio. 
IX.  CONCLUSION—FULL REFORM IN OHIO 
Ohio needs reform, as public confidence in the judiciary is low.200  Campaign 
contributions in judicial campaigns give the appearance of impropriety.201  Judicial 
elections may discourage qualified candidates from running.202  Ohio needs to adopt 
the criteria for judicial selection as outlined by the American Bar Association’s 
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence.203  Specifically, Ohio should require 
any judicial candidate to have been actively practicing for at least the previous ten 
years.204  The judicial candidate should be of strong moral character and enjoy a good 
reputation in the community.205  In order to evaluate a potential jurist’s 
                                                                
194Id. 
195Speech, supra note 186.  “I propose that the legislation provide that if an organization 
expends an aggregate of $10,000 on a judicial campaign, the names of individuals who 
contribute $500 or more to the organization, and the names of groups which contribute at least 
$2,000 to the organization, should be publicly reported.”  Id. 
196Id. 
197Id. 
198Id. 
199Id. 
200See supra Part II.B. 
201See supra Part II.A. 
202See supra Part II.C. 
203See supra Part VII. 
204Commission, supra note 154, at 7. 
205Id. 
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qualifications, a Judicial Eligibility Commission should be established at the state 
level and funded with Ohio state revenue.  The members of the Judicial Eligibility 
Commission should be selected in the manner suggested by the American Bar 
Association Commission on State Judicial Selection Standards.206  All judicial 
candidates should be required to submit all pertinent information to the Judicial 
Eligibility Commission for review.  The Judicial Eligibility Commission should then 
conduct a full review of the candidate and make an objective determination as to 
whether the candidate meets the selection criteria.  Once the Judicial Eligibility 
Commission has made its review, the commission should forward an alphabetized 
list of all potential judges to the Governor.  Unlike the typical judicial nominating 
commission, which would only forward three names for every open position, the 
judicial eligibility commission should forward all the names of qualified candidates 
to the appointing authority.  The Governor, as the appointing authority must select a 
candidate from the list provided by the Judicial Eligibility Commission and then 
forward that name to the state Senate.  The fact that the appointing authority may 
only select a candidate off of the list submitted by the Judicial Eligibility 
Commission will help ensure that there is no real or apparent cronyism.  The Senate 
would then have approval authority over the Governor’s selection similar to the role 
of the United States Senate in federal judicial appointments.  The Senate should be 
required to approve a candidate by majority vote, and any candidate not receiving a 
majority vote should not receive the appointment.   
After a judicial candidate has been approved by a majority of the Senate, the 
judge should sit for a period of two to four years at which point the judge should be 
re-evaluated by a retention evaluation body.207  The retention evaluation body should 
be at least a three-person panel composed of members of the Judicial Eligibility 
Commission serving on a rotating basis.  The retention evaluation body should 
review the judge’s judicial record and compare the judge’s record against the 
standards set by the eligibility commission and forward a report to the Senate.  The 
report should include not only the same evaluative data used by the Judicial 
Eligibility Commission, but also information relating to the judge’s preparation, 
judicial management skills, quality of judicial opinions, and any other information 
the retention body believes to be appropriate.  This information can be collected 
from court records, evaluation surveys filled out by attorneys who have appeared 
before the judge, and from any means the retention body deems appropriate.  I 
propose that Ohio should not adopt the practice of retention elections as typically 
found in merit selection plans.208  Retention elections subject the judge to similar 
pressures as initial elections.  Instead of subjecting the sitting judge to a retention 
election, the state Senate, after receiving the findings of the retention evaluation 
body, should vote to either retain the judge or dismiss the judge.  Provided the Senate 
by majority vote chooses to retain the judge, the judge should receive a term in office 
not less than ten years.   
The method of judicial selection in Ohio is in dire need of reform.  The rhetoric 
in judicial campaigns is tumbling out of control and with the recent Supreme Court 
                                                                
206See supra Part VII.B. 
207See supra Part VII.B.4-VIII. 
208See supra Part III.C. 
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decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, the situation will likely only get 
worse.209  Ohio needs to look to the example of the founding fathers when they set up 
the federal judiciary providing for a fully appointed judiciary.  Despite the difficulty 
in moving to an appointive method of selecting judges in Ohio, as evidenced by the 
previous attempts,210 Ohio needs to make the radical change to an appointive method 
of selecting judges as outlined above in order to shore up public confidence in the 
judiciary and ensure the integrity and impartiality of the courts. 
BRADLEY LINK 
 
                                                                
209See generally Schotland, supra note 148. 
210See supra Part IV. 
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